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Abstract 
The Policy Brief summarizes the discussion which took place 
on 26th – 27th June 2015 at the European University Institute 
(EUI) in Florence in the context of the first workshop of 
ENTraNCE for Executives. The workshop focused on the 
application of antitrust compliance programs in Europe. The 
workshop gathered representatives of National Competition 
Authorities (NCAs), international organizations, academia, 
industry, as well as law firms and economics consultancies. 
During the workshop, participants agreed that private firms 
should introduce compliance programs in order to discourage 
internally antitrust violations; different models of compliance 
programs were compared and analyzed during the workshop. 
On the other hand, different positions emerged in relation to 
the role played by NCAs in designing antitrust compliance 
programs, and whether the existence of a compliance program 
would justify a reduction of the fine imposed by a NCA. 
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On 26th and 27th June 2015, ENTraNCE 
for Executives kicked-off its activities with a 
workshop dealing with the application of antitrust 
compliance programs in Europe. The event was 
divided into 4 panels over two half-days. The 
workshop gathered different stakeholders, who 
exchanged ideas concerning the challenges 
facing private firms in the implementation of 
compliance programs. The participants included 
representatives of the National Competition 
Authorities (NCAs), international organizations, 
academia, industry, as well as law and consulting 
firms. The workshop generated a lively debate. 
While there was a general consensus among the 
attendees on some issues, divergent positions 
emerged among the participants on others. 
This policy-brief aims at summarizing the main 
points of agreement and disagreement that came 
from the discussion.Moreover, the brief aims at 
stimulating further discussion and defining the 
premises for a possible second workshop on the 
same topic.
1.Objectives of antitrust compliance 
programs
• Workshop participants agreed that antitrust 
compliance programs may have different, 
but not necessarily conflicting objectives. 
First of all, they may aim at strengthening the 
development of a common antitrust culture. 
Secondly, they should prevent competition 
law infringements. Thirdly, they increase 
the cases of infringement that undertakings 
are spontaneously reporting to the NCAs. 
Finally, compliance programs also increase 
legal certainty for the undertakings; insofar 
as they become more aware of what kind of 
behavior breaches antitrust rules and can 
thus better assess both internal behaviors 
and the activities of their competitors. 
• Workshop attendees agreed that 
undertakings breaching competition law 
are increasingly exposed to a “stigma” from 
the side of the public opinion. Therefore, 
undertakings should focus more of their 
effort on preventing antitrust infringements 
via compliance programs. Furthermore, 
increased antitrust compliance might 
provide advantages to companies in terms 
of corporate social responsibility and could 
make it easier for them to obtain positive 
legal rating that favor access to financing and 
so forth.
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2. Challenges faced by companies in 
establishing an effective compliance 
program
• While there seems to be a wide and 
increasing consensus among public and 
private stakeholders around the benefits 
of compliance programs, such benefits 
are identified and present only in cases of 
“good” programs. Thus, the main challenge 
lays in the identification of what is a “good” 
compliance program, in order to elaborate 
best practices for its implementation.
• Workshop attendees agreed that for a 
compliance program to be effective, it 
requires serious support from the top 
management of the company. This appears 
to be an absolute key factor for building 
a culture of legality within the company. 
By contrast, mixed signals from the senior 
managers concerning the company´s actual 
willingness to implement a compliance 
program often creates a “shield” for infringing 
behavior within the firm.
• The participants agreed that there is no 
“one size fits all” model for compliance 
programs in every company. The particular 
characteristics of each industry, the market 
dynamics and relevant national regulations 
might play a key role in designing an effective 
and efficient program. Therefore, companies 
have to make a real effort when designing 
compliance programs in a way that could be 
tailored to their specific needs and structure. 
Likewise, NCAs have to make a real effort 
in understanding whether a compliance 
program is tailored to the company’s specific 
needs and structure, especially those NCAs 
that consider effective compliance programs 
to be a mitigating factor.
• Participants further agreed that it is more 
difficult to establish a compliance program 
that prevents Article 102 TFEU infringements 
rather than cartel violations. In fact, the 
assessment of the cases of abuse of dominance 
requires a rather complex analysis by the 
firm. Such analysis can be challenging and 
costly. In designing a compliance program, 
companies should balance costs and the 
expected results. Therefore, undertakings - 
on the basis of a risk-based approach -should 
initially prioritize the prevention of more 
“evident” competition law infringements (i.e. 
cartels) via the compliance program.
• A general consensus emerged on the need to 
speak the language of business-people when 
introducing a compliance program within 
a company. In designing the program, it 
is important to identify the staff at risk, to 
personalise the trainings and to make them 
interesting (for example through networking 
and case studies), in order to incentivize 
active participation of the employees. 
Introducing internal sanctions for breaches 
of the compliance program seems to be 
another possible and effective instrument to 
3 ■  Antitrust Compliance Programs in Europe: Status Quo and Challenges Ahead
gain employees’ attention of the compliance 
program. Monitoring the implementation 
of the compliance program appeared to be 
essential as well. Finally, a “due diligence” 
analysis when hiring new employees 
and acquiring new subsidiaries was also 
recommended as a tool for establishing an 
effective compliance program; the same 
could be done with the trade associations 
before joining them.
• Antitrust compliance programs should not 
only concern large corporations, but Small 
and Medium-size Enterprises (SMEs) as 
well. However, high costs of implementation 
might discourage SMEs from implementing 
compliance programs. In addition to this, 
SMEs tend to believe that competition law 
does not apply to them due to the negligible 
market shares they obtain, which constitutes 
a further disincentive for compliance. When 
costs are the most important element, it is 
important for SMEs to be aware of a number 
of resources available online free of charge to 
start their antitrust compliance journey or to 
further improve the efforts already made.
3. Reporting competition law 
infringements to the NCA
Compliance programs aim at preventing, 
detecting and stopping the infringement of 
antitrust rules. However, it can be disputed 
whether reporting to the NCA should be 
considered a fundamental component of the 
program. On the one hand, companies could 
decide that stopping the infringement is a 
sufficient result; on the other hand, leniency 
programs could be seen as the natural outcome 
in cases where an infringement has been 
detected. Moreover, it should be reminded 
that internal reporting, which creates accounts 
of infringement, might be extremely risky in 
cases of antitrust investigations, as well as in 
terms of discovery obligations in the context of 
damages claims. In a similar line, another factor 
that might discourage the internal reporting 
of antitrust violations is the general absence 
under EU law of the legal privilege for in-house 
lawyers.
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4. The role of NCAs and public bodies in 
compliance programs
• The workshop attendees debated the role 
that NCAs should play in promoting or even 
designing best practices at the national and 
international level. While some participants 
argued that NCAs should provide more 
guidance to companies to this regard, others 
argued that receiving detailed guidelines 
from the NCAs might incentivize the 
implementation of “fake” compliance 
programs: any company could formally 
introduce a compliance program in line 
with the NCA´s best practices, despite the 
lack of willingness to actually implement the 
program. In any case, participants agreed 
that, notwithstanding or in addition to the 
existence of guidelines issued by the NCAs, 
an important role will be played by the latter’s 
approach.
• During the workshop, there was no agreement 
on whether the active involvement of NCAs 
in designing compliance programs could lead 
to beneficial outcomes. In particular, those 
denying that an active involvement of NCAs in 
compliance programs could be beneficial put 
forward the several reasons. First of all, they 
underlined the risk that guidance could lead 
to “cosmetic” compliance programs, without 
achieving any meaningful outcome in terms 
of effectiveness. Secondly, the assumption 
that agencies know better than firms how 
to shape a “good” compliance remains 
unproven. Thirdly, an active involvement 
of NCAs definitely implies costs for public 
bodies with limited resources; therefore, 
the opportunity of such choice should be 
assessed in terms of its effectiveness in 
comparison with other likely lines of action.
•  An additional related point is that a 
beneficial outcome, for all stakeholders and 
especially businesses, could indeed derive 
from a (at least to some extent) converging 
framework on the design and treatment of 
CPs in the EU and internationally. Here legal 
certainty for businesses is at stake, especially 
those active at European/international levels. 
A globalized business may generally benefit 
from converging regulatory approaches. 
That is why international organizations and 
networks (in particular ICN, ECN, OECD) 
include more and more often in their 
agendas an item on antitrust CPs as a tool 
to diffuse competition culture in businesses, 
and therefore in the market at large.
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5. Compliance programs and the design of 
antitrust fines
•  A topic of intense debate during the workshop 
was whether NCAs should consider the 
existence of a compliance program to be 
an attenuating factor in the calculation of 
a fine. Those advocating for it, argued that 
compliance programs complement the 
public enforcement of competition law, by 
supporting the deterrence vis a vis further 
infringements. Secondly, NCAs can detect 
“fake” compliance programs. The NCAs 
should recognize the compliance program 
as an attenuating factor only where the 
infringement proves to be “faultless”; where 
the company proves to have carried out all 
possible measures to seriously implement 
a compliance program and thus avoiding 
the antitrust infringement to take place. 
Furthermore, the NCAs should assess the 
“intent” of the infringer in assessing the 
possibility to qualify for the fine reduction 
in the presence of a compliance program. 
The supporters of the attenuating approach 
finally underline the different treatment of 
antitrust compared to other fields of law, e.g. 
anti-bribery (or, in Italy, the Law n. 231 of 
2001 on the administrative responsibility of 
companies) in relation to which, in a number 
of jurisdiction a mitigation is provided for 
and does not appear to be disputed.
• On the contrary, other participants argued 
that the existence of a compliance program 
should never be considered to be an 
attenuating factor, since undertakings are 
simply shaping their organization in their 
preferred way to fulfil their legal obligations 
to respect the antitrust law.
• A further subject of intense debate concerned 
the opportunity to consider as an aggravating 
factor the fact that a compliance policy is in 
place and the company still infringes antitrust 
rules. The case for making an aggravating 
circumstance appears to be particularly 
strong when the compliance program 
becomes an instrument of the infringement. 
The general consensus was that this option 
might go too far, also raising fundamental 
rights issues in those jurisdictions where 
antitrust infringements are subject to 
criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions.
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6. The diverging approaches followed by NCAs 
in Europe
• At present, there is no common approach 
among the NCAs in Europe concerning 
antitrust compliance programs. While some 
NCAs have adopted guidelines recognizing 
the possibility to grant a fine reduction to 
the companies, which have established a 
compliance program (i.e. UK, France and 
Italy), other authorities are against providing 
any guidelines (i.e. Germany) arguing 
that compliance is a legal obligation of 
the undertakings and thus there can be no 
additional reward for not observing the law.
• Economists have traditionally designed 
models of deterrence based on the probability 
of the sanctions times the predictable amount 
of the sanctions. A reduction of fines for 
companies that apply compliance programs 
may somehow alter these estimations in ways 
that are difficult to predict. However, most 
participants agreed that the limited amount 
of prospected percentage reductions of the 
fines (from 5% to 15%), together with the 
uncertainty about the exact policy applied 
to fines by each NCA in specific cases, may 
ultimately limit the practical relevance of the 
issue.
To conclude, most participants of the workshop 
would agree that compliance programs today 
are an
important complementary instrument in 
combatting antitrust infringements, that their 
present role is primarily cultural, that they 
should not necessarily be used as a reporting 
instrument to NCA’s and that NCA’s should not 
be actively involved in their elaboration. The 
debate about the relation between compliance 
programs and policy of the fines is still very 
open but its practical relevance may be limited. 
All participants agreed that several of the points 
raised in the workshop certainly deserve further 
consideration and discussion.
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